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Abstract
Research on deeper economic cooperation by preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) has mostly centered on the economic implications of the PTAs for dec-
ades. A number of alternative analyses emphasize the role international power
relations and multilateral institutions play in the formation of regional economic
initiatives either positively or negatively. The new generation of FTAs differs
from earlier waves of similar agreements of the nineteen and twenty centuries.
They are probably much less about economic benefits than geostrategic objec-
tives and global political concerns. It is, however, almost inevitable that in a pe-
riod of uncertain economic growth “…the ultimate success of the negotiations
and the long-term viability of the arrangements turn more on economic and
commercial considerations” (World Economic Forum 2014: 18).
Introduction
For decades, mainstream research focused almost exclusively on the economic
implications of preferential trade agreements. In most cases ex ante theoretical
studies and impact assessments have emphasized mostly the positive impacts
experienced by the countries participating in such arrangements, while possible
negative outcomes were considered unlikely scenarios.
1
Recent international
trade discourse has been dominated by mega-regional trade agreements.
2
These
trade agreements can produce widespread and often unforeseen effects on domes-
tic economies, international relations and politics. These impacts are very diffi-
1
According to the literature, there seems to be a consensus that earlier arrangements in
the nineteenth century were more positive in terms of trade creation while those between
the world wars were mostly trade diverting. But regarding the implications of preferential
trade agreements concluded after World War II there is no consent at all (Mansfield
1999: 593).
2
In this paper the term “mega-regional” FTA is used to mean agreements that in-volve
three or more countries; cover at least 25 percent of global trade flows; and include regu-
latory commitments rather than trade liberalization (Draper, Lacey, Ramkolowan 2014:
8). From another perspective, these deals can be classified as deep arrangements which
cover several measures beyond tariffs. These agreements also change tariffs but the most
important implications relate to nontariff barriers, regulations and standards, or other sim-
ilar measures (Lawrence 1996).
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cult to forecast or fully understand given the uncertainties regarding the content
of the final agreements and lack of consent about the impacts of such large-scale
arrangements. Mutually advantageous implications of ambitious free trade
agreements under negotiation, however, cannot be taken for granted.
In the past decade the multilateral system administered by the WTO
came under challenge. A number of rapidly developing countries do not share the
core principles that have underpinned open rules-based commerce or more pre-
cisely, they do not accept the rules of Western dominated institutions without
having their say properly heard. Several states consider that traditional institu-
tions of international economic relations and regulation do not take into account
the changing global power relations. Large emerging countries including China,
India or Brazil are becoming increasingly important economic and political play-
ers globally (or regionally – Russia); but, their weight is not fully reflected in the
international power relations.
3
Most advanced countries consider this develop-
ment to be a major challenge to the international economic and political system –
the very system they once used to have almost exclusive influence over the
world. These different interests led to either the paralyzation of some internation-
al organizations or to their reforms (the IMF is a good example) or to the dead-
lock of their operations (e.g. the WTO) or to increasing political and security
challenges (Russia).
Given these significant changes, it seems that the declining global he-
gemony of the US – mostly in terms of economic indicators – and the very poor
economic performance of the European Union, have contributed to the current
wave of regionalism through deep trade deals. It is also most certainly true that
we have entered into a new phase of international power relations.
4
The new
mega-deal proposals constitute a new-generation of negotiations aimed at reposi-
tioning economies in a more intensified global competition. Other opinions go
further by emphasizing that the new generation of FTAs may be an appropriate
means in managing the challenges of emerging countries. On the other hand,
however, these agreements are feared to undermine the social model of Europe.
The basic question for many analysts and policy makers in Europe is how the
economic problems can be managed in a sustainable way while preserving the
values of the social market economic systems that Europe is justifiably so proud
3
For example, the organizational reform of IMF has been stalled since 2010 by the ob-
structions imposed by the US Senate. The reform would grant increasing voting powers
to developing countries. See, for example, the latest coverage: Statement by IMF Manag-
ing Director Christine Lagarde on IMF Quota and Governance Reforms. For more infor-
mation see Press Release No.14/568, December 12, 2014 accessible at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14568.htm
4
As Pascal Lamy, Director-General of WTO in 2012 put it: “The old theories and hy-
potheses which governed the way we looked at trade in the twentieth century will require
better calibration with the new reality of trade in the twenty-first century.” Article availa-
ble at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl258_e.htm
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of (e.g. labor regulations, environmental protection, health care and pension sys-
tems etc.).
Today mega-trade deals seem to be used more extensively to influence
future economic, political and interstate power relations on a global scale. The
uncertainties, however, regarding the impacts of these agreements are significant
and no one can predict the future with much confidence. The economic argu-
ments in support of TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) seem to be based on wishful thinking – an ap-
proach that several times has biased the fair ex ante evaluations of PTAs or deep-
er economic cooperation (Barbee 2014: 208).
Waves of Free Trade Agreements
The underlying reasons behind the establishment of Free Trade Agreements have
been numerous since the second half of the nineteenth century when the very first
wave of such arrangements was initiated. In addition to the bilateral free trade
agreement between Great Britain and France in 1860, which involved the MFN
clause, several customs unions were also established at the time (Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Italy etc.) which had led to a remarkable trade liberalization,
an almost complete single market in Europe by the turn of the century, covering a
very large share of the global trade flows. Between the two World Wars a com-
pletely different international economic system emerged in which the new re-
gional arrangements had caused trade to divert and eventually separated trade
blocks from each other and, as such, pursued inward looking, trade protectionist
policies. All such initiatives were highly preferential in the time of the Great De-
pression.
Although expected, economic benefits have always been one of the most
important driving forces behind the waves of regional economic integration, from
time to time, additional interests and objectives would surface. There have been
times when economic benefits were subdued to international political interests.
We witnessed an especially complex set of motives after World War II. Some of
the most important perspectives are as follows: (1) FTAs were often utilized by
larger states to intensify their economic and political influence on smaller coun-
tries. A prime example for this type of motivation is the establishment of COM-
ECOM (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in order to coordinate the
economic development in Easter Europe, but it goes without saying that control
over this geographically vast economic integration was in the hands of the Soviet
Union. (2) An additional motivating force behind the birth of FTAs was the de-
sire to reduce the collective dependence of groups of states on third parties. Typi-
cal examples include the regional initiatives between developing countries during
the fifties and the sixties in order to mitigate their vulnerability in international
economic relations against more developed regions. (3) The establishment of the
European Communities after World War II seems to be the most successful at-
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tempt at managing the security policy challenges posed by the Soviet Union. (4)
In other cases regional arrangements promoted and consolidated domestic eco-
nomic reforms and democratic transformation. This was the case of the EU inte-
gration of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The waves of enlargement in the Europe-
an Union have demonstrated that economic integration can usefully serve as the
driving force for political cooperation and as a means of “stability export” both in
economic and political understanding.
While stronger economic ties or broader economic opportunities worked
well in developed Western European countries, economic integration and coop-
eration between less developed countries were less successful. By the end of the
eighties, several earlier assumptions had changed. Reforms and political trans-
formation had taken place in many parts of the world which created a new
framework for trade agreements. In less developed countries the earlier autarchy-
oriented, inward-looking policies had changed. Import substitution strategies and
integrations have always faced the same burden: lack of capital, the inability to
obtain the latest technologies, and the scarcity of qualified labor force. These
countries started to become more open towards international economic (trade and
FDI) cooperation. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and politi-
cal changes in the Soviet space prompted a number of countries to stabilize their
internal transformation by entering the European Union. In addition, in the Post-
Soviet region we also witnessed several attempts by Russia to create a sort of
economic integration. In this period, the objective of small countries became in-
creasingly centered on the need to align and integrate with a large “center” – it
was expected that several benefits may be associated with this adjustment, in-
cluding the inflow of FDI, improving export performance and the stabilization of
political systems after transitioning from an autocratic regime to a democratic
one.
Changing Interstate Power Relations and the Role of FTAs
After World War II, the GATT liberalization and the establishment of preferen-
tial trade arrangements went hand in hand for several decades and they seemed to
be complementing each other. But, because of the significant changes in the
global business environment and interstate power relations recently, the two pro-
cesses started to move in completely different directions. These changes had con-
tributed to the emergence of a new wave of regional integration efforts completed
now with several novel features.
(1) In contrast to previous decades, trade liberalization in the manufactur-
ing of goods in the multilateral framework had deepened. As a result, the poten-
tial benefits of free trade agreements stemming from the elimination of tariffs
would only make a limited impact in most cases. In other words, the Vinerian
balance of losses and benefits in terms of trade diversion and trade creation –
even in theory – should be small without additional efforts to extend the scope of
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the arrangements. (2) Foreign direct investments of recent years resulted in the
emergence of global value chains that strengthened multiple economic ties not
only between neighboring countries, but across regions and continents. FDI links
and relations became much more convoluted compared to previous decades (cen-
turies) due to the new strategies of large transnational firms. (3) Some of the ar-
rangements made since the nineties started to become deeper and deeper as they
were no longer just about tariff cuts. Non-tariff barriers were also being eliminat-
ed or other fields of economic policies were being harmonized. (4) The discrep-
ancy between global liberalization and regional cooperation became even more
evident. Multilateral trade negotiations stalled and very little or no advancement
was made in this regard. (5) Once hailed as the most successful integration effort,
the European Union and most importantly the Eurozone were facing a series of
crises ranging from economic growth problems to income inequalities and social
hardships. (6) The shift in the global economic balance of power intensified after
the turn of the millennium and was coupled with the consequences of the eco-
nomic crisis unfolding after 2008. It was against this backdrop that negotiations
of mega-regional trade agreements were started with the objective of establishing
deep integration with countries that possess overwhelming shares in global trade
and FDI and place central role in the emerging global value chains – a develop-
ment that has attracted great attention in recent years from among scholars and
large international economic institutions.
5
Due to these changes, the twenty and twenty first century regional trade
agreements or regional arrangements should be fundamentally different from
each other. As Richard Baldwin puts it: “[t]wentieth-century RTAs concern
‘made-here-sold-there’ goods, while 21
st
century regionalism concern ‘made-
everywhere-sold-there’ goods. The difference means that 21
st
century RTAs in-
clude rules on making goods as well as selling them” (Baldwin 2014: 5). The
mega-regional deals are increasingly thought to be motivated not simply by eco-
nomic objectives, but more importantly by geopolitical considerations (or simply
by international political objectives) which is not in contradiction with the previ-
ously mentioned diverse set of motivations behind earlier trade arrangements.
Referring to more details, the following motives can be identified behind
the large objective of “geopolitics.” (1) In recent years, economic growth in the
world has been uneven. Large emerging countries have experienced rapid eco-
nomic convergence led by China’s catching up in the past decade, but other states
also have shown growing influence on global economic developments and trade.
China has overtaken the US in term of its share in global GDP (it is measured at
PPP, but it is still an important development).
6
As a result, the soft power of
5
See inter alia for example: Interconnected Economies. Benefiting from Global Value
Chains. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264189560-en; or IMF 2013.
etc.
6
For most recent data see the World Economic Outlook of the IMF see
http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02.
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emerging countries and especially that of China may challenge the soft power of
the US and the EU (Stiglitz 2015). (2) The European economy has been strug-
gling since 2008. Lack of economic growth and emerging social problems in a
number of member states are threatening the very foundations of the EU. It
seems that we are not only dealing with temporary economic stagnation affecting
a few countries, but with a rudimentary, systemic problem, the crisis of the Euro-
zone. As a result, dissatisfaction among the population is increasing, domestic
political challenges are growing and future prospects are unclear.
The emergence of contemporary large deals is explained by the need to
set standards to which emerging nations should adjust if they wanted to benefit
from international economic relations with large industrialized nations. These
new trade arrangements may win some time for the current most developed coun-
tries: if these deals succeed, and emerging countries adjust, then they will follow
western rules and comply with liberal market economic principles. Economic
benefits of FTAs – and deeper cooperation – are not at all obvious today. Ex ante
and ex post analyses of FTAs also differ from each other considerably and in re-
cent decades it has been almost impossible to separate the economic impacts of
institutionalization of cooperation (e.g. a free trade agreement) and the impacts of
overall global liberalization (Vetter 2013: 3). While geopolitical motives may be
important from the perspectives of the launching and negotiating mega-regional
trade agreements, these considerations are insufficient to implement them in a
long term sustainable way. In other words, “TTIP at its core is an economic ne-
gotiation that in the end will stand or fall on its economic merits” (Hamilton
2014: VII).
7
Many decision makers and analysts view the emergence of these agree-
ments as a tool to influence interstate power relations – an approach that seems to
be similar to the race during the Cold War between the West and the East. Ac-
cording to this perspective, the changing economic realities may be influenced by
building blocks that are unified by the unlimited liberalization of economic flows
and regulation. This way the free trade agreements may serve as a means to
strengthen political alliances with long term partners in the developed world.
Building blocks also seem to follow the logic of the interwar period. An im-
portant difference from the interwar period is the existence of the WTO, a multi-
lateral institution that may mitigate the risks associated with building blocks –
provided it can function properly. If not, the future of international economic re-
lations and the prospects depend on the reaction of large emerging countries cur-
rently not participating in the negotiations.
Here an interesting theoretical notion put forward by Paul Krugman is
worth considering. According to Krugman, if a country with PTA tries to use its
power to influence global trends; this may lead to disastrous consequences if oth-
7
A recent paper argues that official studies do not offer a solid basis for an informed de-
cision on TTIP. See Capaldo 2014.
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er similar agreements are in place because “the blocs may beggar each other.
That is, the formation of blocs can, in effect, set off a beggar-all trade war that
leaves everyone worse off” (Krugman 1991: 8). According to him, these negative
impacts may only be minimized if trade blocks are few or if there is a very large
number of such arrangements. If there is only one block, then it is global free
trade. He argues that “world welfare is minimized for a world of three trading
blocs” (Krugman 1991: 12). If we consider this, it is remarkable that the share of
TTIP and TPP in terms of global GDP and global trade is over fifty percent (ex-
cluding the double counting of the US). From this perspective, the idea of RCEP
(Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) may attract greater attention in
the future.
Options and Conclusions
If the US led mega-deals fail, it will hurt the image and leadership of advanced
countries in international trade issues in favor of emerging nations, most im-
portantly China. If the deals are successful, developed countries will get addi-
tional leadership by setting norms and regulations for large segments of interna-
tional trade flows (Dube 2014: 17). Taking into account the above considera-
tions, the most important question concerns the response of third countries, espe-
cially large emerging countries having a major role in formulating global shifts
and changes. The basic strategies are the following.
1. Wait and see. There are a lot of uncertainties surrounding these deals
especially the TTIP because of the widely different opinions within the European
Union. Most critics are focusing on the ISDS (Investor State Dispute Settlement),
environmental protections or GMO (Genetic Modified Organisms) products. For
third countries, it is reasonable to wait and see what the final outcome of the
agreements concerned will be. The external situation and the negotiation posi-
tions may change significantly. It cannot be ruled out that significant concessions
and compromises will be the only solution for consolidating these diverging in-
terests. Just to mention one issue: probably it would be reasonable to abandon the
ISDS in its current form in TTIP negotiations given the very negative opinions
and sentiments of a wide circle of stakeholders.
8
2. Disengagement from global trade liberalization. If multilateral trade
negotiations are blocked because of internal conflicts (between advanced and
emerging states) then several countries may become even more disinterested in
international trade liberalization. Mega-trade deals coupled with slow progress in
multilateral trade negotiations could easily result in developing inward-looking
or more protectionist policies in several countries.
8
Among many other proposals see for example: Congressional Financial Services Com-
mittee leaders: Exclude ISDS from US-EU deal http://www.bilaterals.org/?congressional-
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3. Unilateral significant liberalization of excluded countries. This would
serve as a means to mitigate the trade diversion impacts due to mega-deals. Alt-
hough it is not very likely, theoretically we can construct a framework where out-
side countries with large liberalization or adjustment efforts can simply eliminate
most of the advantages of the participants in mega-trade deals while preserving
some independence in their regulatory framework (World Economic Forum
2014: 28-29).
4. Joining mega-deals. This is the same strategy that was followed by
mostly smaller countries in earlier decades when they considered it their interest
to swiftly adjust to the rules defined by larger countries. This is a quite reasona-
ble strategy for small states with insufficient domestic factors of production to
boost growth. The situation may be different for large countries, but even in their
case, bilateral negotiations of a certain kind with the EU or the US may be feasi-
ble. In fact, this would be the best scenario for advanced nations since this would
mean that large emerging countries are willing to adjust to the rules set by the US
and the EU. As a result the rule setter and rule taker position would not change
much globally.
5. Trade war by establishing new trading blocks. Although trade between
large outside countries is somehow limited mostly for geographical reasons, the-
oretically, the establishment of other trade deals with the participation of large
countries and nations from the African continent, Far Eastern and South Ameri-
can countries cannot be ruled out. China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil and
Nigeria altogether make up almost 45 percent of the global population. If we ac-
cept that mega FTAs currently negotiated are more and more driven by political
and strategic interests and not only by economic ones, the establishment of alter-
native competing arrangements may be a realistic option.
6. Revitalization of the WTO.As stated in the World Economic Forum
(2014), “[i]f the RTAs and their power asymmetries take over, there is a risk that
the GATT/WTO would go down in future history books as a 70-year experiment
where world trade was rules based instead of power-based” (27). Something sim-
ilar happened to the IMF before the economic crisis of 2008. Current perspec-
tives for larger engagement of WTO in global trade talks are low. Hopes, howev-
er, are realistic given the small steps taken in the Bali ministerial meeting, which
were celebrated loudly. In fact, for the time being, these small agreements saved
the WTO from falling into oblivion. Its future existence is still not based on
strong foundations. The role of IMF in global affairs was revalued due to the
economic crisis. If mega-deals fall short of expectations, the WTO can still serve
as an instrument of global cooperation in international trade.
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